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THE CONSTITUTION'S FORGOTTEN COVER 
LETTER: AN ESSAY ON THE NEW 
FEDERALISM AND THE ORIGINAL 
UNDERSTANDING 
Daniel A. Farber* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the summer of 1787, the Philadelphia Convention 
issued two documents. One was the Constitution itself. The other 
document, now almost forgotten even by constitutional historians, 
was an official letter to Congress, signed by George Washington on 
behalf of the Convention.1 Congress responded with a resolution 
that the Constitution and "letter accompanying the same" be sent 
to the state legislatures for submission to conventions in each state.2 
The Washington letter lacks the detail and depth of some other 
evidence of original intent. Being a cover letter, it was designed 
only to introduce the accompanying document rather than to plumb 
its meaning. But the letter's official nature gives it a status not 
shared by Madison's personal notes or newspaper editorials such as 
the Federalist Papers. As we will see, the Washington letter con-
tains significant clues about the nature of the document that the 
Convention was placing before the country. Although it cannot 
supplant other, more traditional sources, it can help to illuminate 
the original understanding of the Framers. 3 
Recourse to this source is particularly appropriate now, in a 
year when we have twice been admonished to return to the "first 
* Acting Associate Vice-President for Academic Affairs, Associate Dean for Faculty Re-
search and Development, and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
B.A. 1971, M.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, Illinois. - Ed. I would like to thank Jim Chen, Phil 
Frickey, Mark Killenbeck, Mike Paulsen, Jeff Powell, and Suzanna Sherry for their helpful 
comments. 
1. See Letter of the President of the Federal Convention to the President of Congress 
(Sept. 17, 1787), in FORMATION OF TilE UNION OF TilE AMERICAN STATES 1003 (Charles C. 
Tansill ed., 1927). A complete copy of the letter can be found in the Appendix to this essay. 
2. See Resolution of Congress of September 28, 1787, Submitting the Constitution to the 
Several States, in FORMATION OF nm UNION, supra note 1, at 1007. 
3. Except where the context makes it important to draw a distinction, this essay uses the 
tenn Framers to refer to both the Philadelphia Convention and the ratifiers. 
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principles" of federalism.4 On one of these occasions, departing 
from almost sixty years of past practice, the Court ruled that Con-
gress had exceeded its power to regulate private activity under the 
Commerce Clause.5 In the other case, only the defection of Justice 
Kennedy prevented the same block of Justices from holding that 
ultimate sovereignty lies in the people of the individual states, 
rather than in a single national populace.6 "We, the People," ac-
cording to these Justices, means "we the peoples of the various 
states," rather than "We the American people."? 
It is only fair to consider the extent to which these "first princi-
ples" are congruent with the views of those who framed the Consti-
tution. But the multitude of available sources, many of them 
conflicting, ambiguous, or unreliable, complicates this inquiry. The 
Convention's cover letter provides useful assistance because of its 
official standing as the unanimous public expression of the Conven-
tion's views. In this respect, it compares quite favorably with 
Madison's notes, which were not available to the public until many 
years later, and with the Federalist Papers, which presented the un-
official views of two prominent delegates.s Further, because it 
seems to have been regarded as noncontroversial, both in the Con-
vention and elsewhere, it may help illuminate the most important of 
understandings - those that were considered too clear to require 
discussion. 
This essay uses the Washington letter to test current assertions 
about the original understanding of federalism. Part II of the essay 
explores the New Federalism- the emerging conservative theory 
of federalism. Although the New Federalism had its most dramatic 
impact in Lopez and its most radical expression in the Term Limits 
dissent, it began in a series of earlier opinions and in the work of 
conservative constitutional theorists. Part II traces this develop-
ment. Part III then considers the significance of the Washington 
letter in more detail. As Part III explains, recent conservative writ-
ings about interpretation provide strong reasons to reassess the 
traditional obscurity of the Washington letter. With these pre-
liminaries out of the way, Part IV uses the Washington letter to 
4. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. a. 1842, 1875 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 
115 s. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995). 
5. See Lopez, 115 S. a. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
6. See Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875. 
7. See 115 S. Ct. at 1876 n.l. 
8. With the minor exception of the handful of Federalist Papers authored by John Jay. 
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probe three elements of the New Federalism: its understanding of 
the scope of national power; its concept of sovereignty; and its vi-
sion of the states as safeguards against the federal government. 
Part V contains some brief closing thoughts about the Washington 
letter and the New Federalism. 
In general, the Washington letter supports the arguments of his-
torians who have attributed a more nationalist spirit to the Framers 
than that contemplated by the New Federalists.9 To the extent that 
their goal is to keep faith with the spirit of the Framers, the New 
Federalists seem to have struck a somewhat dissonant chord. If the 
burden of proof is on the New Federalists to justify a change in 
current law, they have failed to carry that burden.to 
It is important to bear in mind the limited extent of the current 
dispute over federalism. The Constitution undeniably contemplates 
the existence of the states as important elements of the structure of 
government. The federal government clearly was the recipient of 
enumerated powers, and any remaining powers of government 
were reserved to the states. But the question is how to construe 
that reservation to the states. 
We might analogize the reserved powers of the state to the 
share of a residuary legatee in a will. On the one hand, the Framers 
may have thought it critically important that the states retain sub-
stantial regulatory autonomy. If so, courts have reason to construe 
the specific bequests so as to maintain a substantial residue. That is 
the New Federalist view. Or perhaps the states were more like a 
charity chosen for tax purposes to inherit the residue of the estate 
- here, that being whatever powers happened to be left over or 
whatever authority Congress chose not to exercise. Although the 
Framers may have expected the residuary bequest to be large, 
maintaining its size may not have been an important goal of their 
constitutional testament. If so, it should play little role in constru-
ing the specific bequests. In approaching this question, it is helpful 
to understand the overall "estate plan," which in this case is clari-
fied to some degree by the Washington letter, as well as the place of 
the residuary legatees in the testator's affections. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 64-69. 
10. I wish to emphasize that this essay is critical rather than synthetic. That is, it sets 
forth counterarguments to the arguments made by the New Federalists and attempts to show 
that their arguments are unpersuasive. But even assuming that the essay successfully makes 
its case, that does not establish that the conclusions drawn by the New Federalists are incor-
rect, only that they are poorly supported. 
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II. THE NEW FEDERALISM 
A. The Origins of the New Federalism 
The New Federalism did not emerge full-grown in the 1994 
Term. Instead, it was an outgrowth of conservative jurists' and 
scholars' continuing concern over federal invasions of state 
prerogatives. 
This concern surfaced dramatically two decades before Lopez in 
National League of Cities v. Usery,ll which, like Lopez, was au-
thored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. With Justice Blackmun provid-
ing the somewhat unenthusiastic fifth vote, Justice Rehnquist held 
that applying the federal minimum wage to certain state employees 
unconstitutionally invaded the "attributes of sovereignty attaching 
to every state government."12 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
& Reclamation Assn., 13 the Court articulated a three-part test based 
on League of Cities, which it then applied to uphold federal regula-
tion of strip mining. According to Hodel, to be struck down for 
exceeding congressional power, a statute must regulate the "States 
as States," it must "address matters that are indisputably 'attri-
bute[s] of state sovereignty,' " and it must directly impair" 'integral 
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.' "14 Note 
the emergence of two themes of the New Federalism: reverence 
toward state sovereignty and protectiveness toward traditional state 
functions.1s 
The Hodel test, in practice, proved fatal to state claims of immu-
nity. Following Hodel, the Court unanimously held that federal 
regulation of state-owned railroads "does not impair a state's ability 
to function as a state."16 Then, the Court narrowly upheld a federal 
statute requiring state utility commissions to consider certain meth-
ods of energy conservationP Finally, a closely divided Court up-
held the application to state park employees of a federal ban on 
compulsory retirement.1s 
11. 426 u.s. 833 {1976). 
12. 426 U.S. at 845. 
13. 452 u.s. 264 {1981). 
14. 452 U.S. at 287-88 (citations omitted). 
15. In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist suggested - ominously, in retrospect -
that the Court should give more serious consideration to whether congressional regulation, 
even of private parties, falls within the Commerce Clause. 452 U.S. at 310. 
16. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 686 {1982). 
17. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commn. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 {1982). 
18. The Court agreed that park management is a traditional state function but held that 
the third prong of Hodel was not met because eliminating mandatory retirement would have 
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Ultimately to complete this oft-told story - Justice 
Blackmun thought better of his vote in League of Cities and wrote 
the majority opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 19 which overruled League of Cities. The thrust of the 
Garcia opinion is that the Constitution indeed does presume the 
existence of independently functioning state governments but that 
the primary safeguard against federal interference is structural.2o 
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Garcia broached a theme that was 
to figure heavily in later New Federalist opinions. She argued that 
the Framers viewed the commerce power as "important but limited, 
and expected that it would be used primarily if not exclusively to 
remove interstate tariffs and to regulate maritime affairs and large-
scale mercantile enterprise. "21 To protect the basic federal scheme 
in an era when interstate commerce has mushroomed, Justice 
O'Connor suggested, the Court needed to defend at least the inter-
nal operations of the state government from federal regulation. 
Commentators generally assumed, as Justice O'Connor had, the 
validity of the general expansion of federal legislative power. The 
problem was to protect the independent policymaking role of the 
states in a world in which the threat of federal preemption was, by 
common agreement, virtually omnipresent.22 Among other pos-
sibilities, the Guarantee Clause was invoked as a basis for this 
process-based protection for states' rights.23 
Despite League of Cities and the Garcia dissent, states' rights 
had not been a particularly prominent part of conservative jurispru-
dence. No less a conservative than Robert Bork had represented 
the federal government in League of Cities. 24 Even in 1982, such 
only a marginal effect on the state's ability to operate its parks efficiently. See EEOC v. 
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 {1983). 
19. 469 u.s. 528 {1985). 
20. This argument stems from HERBERT WECHSLER, The Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49-82 (1961). For a somewhat skep-
tical appraisal of this argument, see Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 V AND. L. 
REV. 1485 (1994). 
21. 469 U.S. at 583. 
22. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism 
for a Third Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 {1988); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to 
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 341. 
23. See Charles L. Black, Jr., On Worrying About the Constitution, 55 U. CoLO. L. REv. 
469 {1984); Merritt, supra note 22. Note that Merritt does not want to contract federal regu-
latory power, only to maintain "republican" state governments. 
24. Bork argued the case as Solicitor General. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U.S. 833, 834 (1976). But see RoBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE 
PoLITICAL SEoucnoN oF nm LAw 184 (1990) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment guaran-
tees federalism). 
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prominent conservatives as Charles Fried and Antonin Scalia were 
notably unenthusiastic about states' rights.25 Fried suggested that 
the seeds of the current federal dominance may have been present 
from the beginning,26 while Scalia's peroration took an unabashedly 
nationalist stand: "I urge you, then - as Hamilton would have 
urged you - to keep in mind that the federal government is not 
bad but _good. The trick is to use it wisely."27 
In the late 1980s, however, some conservative theorists began to 
take a more vigorous stance in defense of the states. Raoul Berger 
continued his campaign for unadulterated originalism with a book 
on federalism.28 Berger's book anticipates the later views of Justice 
Thomas on several key points: that the states predated the federal 
government and retained their separate sovereign existence after 
ratification;29 that the Commerce Clause extends only to trade 
across state lines;30 and that the Supreme Court's Commerce 
Clause doctrines are ripe for reevaluation.31 Similarly, Richard 
Epstein argued that "the Ford Motor Company did not manufac-
ture goods in interstate commerce, but the Northern Pacific Rail-
road shipped them in interstate commerce."32 Epstein concluded in 
no uncertain terms that the Commerce Clause should be limited to 
"interstate transportation, navigation and sales, and the activities 
closely incident to them. All else should be left to the states."33 A 
third effort to rethink federalism took a markedly less radical tone. 
In a review of Berger's book, Michael McConnell attempted to 
make the intellectual case for federalism.34 He stressed the poten-
tial practical benefits of federalism but gave more emphasis to the 
role of federalism in protecting individual rights and preserving lo-
cal self-rule.35 
25. See Charles Fried, Federalism- Why Should We Care?, 6 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 1 
(1982); Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 19 (1982). 
26. See Fried, supra note 25, at 2. 
27. Scalia, supra note 25, at 22. 
28. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERAUSM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN {1987). 
29. See id. at 32-34. 
30. See id. at 125. 
31. See id. at 166-70. Notably, Berger does concede that it is probably impractical to root 
out all of the federal regulatory structure that has accumulated over the decades, but at least 
a freeze on further expansion, if not some pruning, is required. See id. at 178-80. 
32. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387, 
1442 {1987). 
33. Id. at 1454. 
34. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 1484 (1987) {book review). For contrary arguments, see Edward L. Rubin & Mal-
colm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994). 
35. See McConnell, supra note 34, at 1500-07. 
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It was only in the early 1990s that the conservative Justices re-
turned to the task of reinvigorating federalism. The opening salvo 
was Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Gregory v. 
Ashcroft. 36 The issue in Gregory was whether the ADEA37 applied 
to certain state judges. Justice O'Connor took advantage of the oc-
casion to delve into the theory of federalism.38 The principal bene-
fit of the "constitutionally mandated balance of power"39 between 
the two levels of government is that it prevents government abuse 
and protects individual liberty: 
If this "double security" is to be effective, there must be a proper 
balance between the States and the Federal Government. These twin 
powers will act as mutual restraints only if both are credible. In the 
tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty. 
The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in this deli-
cate balance: the Supremacy Clause. As long as it is acting within the 
powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its 
will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regu-
lated by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist 
system.40 
Although Gregory was purportedly only a statutory interpretation 
case,41 its constitutional overtones were clear. 
Justice O'Connor had the opportunity to apply her :theory in a 
purely constitutional setting in New York v. United States.42 Rein-
forcing her discussion of the values of federalism in Gregory, Justice 
O'Connor ruled that direct federal coercion of states can never be 
allowed, regardless of the strength of the government's regulatory 
interest.43 This holding, notably, elevates state sovereignty over 
36. 501 u.s. 452 (1991). 
37. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)). 
38. Describing the states and the federal government as "joint sovereigns," she argued 
that this structure "assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the 
diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in 
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and 
it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citi-
zenry." 501 U.S. at 458 (citing McConnell, supra note 34, at 1493-500, and Merritt, supra 
note 22, at 3-10). 
39. 501 U.S. at 458 (citations omitted). 
40. 501 U.S. at 459-60 (citation omitted). Note Justice O'Connor's obvious discomfort 
with the Supremacy Clause, which she apparently considers somewhat at odds with her idea 
of a normal federalist system. 
41. Based on this vision of federalism, the Court held that it would construe a federal 
statute to regulate the qualifications of state officials only if it was unambiguously required 
by a plain statement to that effect- a statement that was lacking in Gregory. See 501 U.S. at 
470. 
42. 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
43. At issue was whether Congress could force states to establish programs for disposing 
of low-level radioactive waste, at penalty of "taking title" to the waste if they failed to enact 
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such less substantial interests as racial equality and freedom of 
speech, both of which can be impaired on the basis of a sufficiently 
compelling government interest. 
B. The New Federalism Comes of Age 
In 1995, the New Federalism broke out of the limited area of 
state immunity. Each of the recent opinions - the Term Limits 
dissent and the majority and concurring opinions in Lopez- elab-
orates on different aspects of the New Federalism and deserves in-
dividual attention. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Lopez is 
predominantly doctrinal. At the outset, however, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist does advert to "first principles." Relying on Madison's 
characterization of federal powers as "few and defined" while state 
powers are "numerous and indefinite," Justice Rehnquist then 
quoted from Gregory about the role of this division of powers in 
preserving liberty.44 Admittedly, he added, the scope of federal 
power had greatly increased in the post-New Deal era, partly be-
cause of the "great changes" in the economy and partly because of 
a desire to eliminate what were considered artificial restraints on 
federal power.45 Having analyzed the post-New Deal case law, 
however, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the school gun law at 
issue in Lopez46 did not fall squarely within the previously recog-
nized scope of congressional power. He declined to expand that 
scope any further. 
The concurring opinions have more theoretical substance. Jus-
tice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, reiterated the Gregory 
vision of federalism as a protection for individual liberty.47 The 
statute before the Court, he concluded, "upsets the federal balance 
to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the com-
merce power."48 Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests that the 
Court should preserve the current balance between the states and 
such a program on schedule. See 505 U.S. at 174-77. The statute is obviously designed to 
deal with the NIMBY syndrome (Not in My Back Yard): every state wanted to generate low-
level waste in local medical facilities, but every state wanted some other state to take the 
responsibility for providing a site for disposal. For an argument in favor of upholding the 
statute, see Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Comman-
deer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1995). 
44. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. a. 1624, 1626 (1995). 
45. See 115 S. a. at 1628. 
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994). 
47. See 115 S. a. at 1638-39. 
48. 115 s. a. at 1640. 
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the federal government rather than begin a rollback of federal 
power.49 Justice Kennedy concluded that the statute intruded on 
state sovereignty and that, in the absence of a stronger link with 
commercial concerns, "that interference contradicts the federal bal-
ance the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to 
enforce. "5° 
If Justice Kennedy offered qualified support for the majority, 
Justice Thomas clearly believed that the majority had not gone far 
enough. Like Epstein and Berger,51 he argued that modem Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence is almost wholly illegitimate. His anal-
ysis rests on two premises. First, commerce consists only of sales 
transactions and transportation in connection with those transac-
tions.52 Second, agriculture, manufacturing, and most other areas 
of life should be subject only to state regulation.53 Epstein and 
Berger, who had seemed far outside the mainstream a few years 
before, now had the solid support of at least one Justice. 
Maybe more than just one: Justice Thomas's dissent in the Term 
Limits case was equally audacious, but here he spoke for four Jus-
tices. Term Limits involved a state's power to set term limits for 
members of Congress. The majority view was that this power per-
tained solely to the new government created by the Constitution 
rather than to any preexisting state authority. Hence, the majority 
said, this power was not "reserved" by the Tenth Amendment. In 
the course of this discussion, Justice Stevens's majority opinion ex-
plains the conventional view of state and federal sovereignty. 
Under the Articles of Confederation, " 'the States retained most of 
their sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only by 
49. See 115 S. a. at 1638-39 (stating that citizens need to be able to identify those respon-
sible for government action and should be able to rely on the traditional boundaries between 
the activities of federal and state governments); 115 s. a. at 1640 (claiming that the gun 
control Act was objectionable because it invades a traditional area of state regulation, 
education). 
50. 115 s. a. at 1642. 
51. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. 
52. See 115 S. a. at 1643-44. 
53. According to Justice Thomas, the exchanges during the ratification campaign reveal 
the relatively limited reach of the Commerce Clause and federal power: 
The Founding Fathers confirmed that most areas of life (even many matters that would 
have substantial effects on commerce) would remain outside the reach of the Federal 
Government. Such affairs would continue to be under the exclusive control of the 
States . 
• . . [D]espite being well aware that agriculture, manufacturing, and other matters 
substantially affected commerce, the founding generation did not cede authority over all 
these activities to Congress. Hamilton, for instance, acknowledged that the Federal 
Government could not regulate agriculture and like concerns .... 
115 S. Ct. at 1645. 
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treaties,'" but the new Constitution "reject[ed] the notion that the 
Nation was a collection of States, and instead creat[ed] a direct link 
between the National Government and the people of the United 
States."54 A patchwork of local qualifications for federal office, 
Justice Stevens argued, would "sever the direct link that the Fram-
ers found so critical between the ·National Government and the 
people of the United States."ss 
Justice Thomas's dissent squarely rejects this vision of national 
sovereignty: "Because the majority fundamentally misunderstands 
the notion of 'reserved' powers, I start with some first principles."56 
The most basic of these first principles, according to Justice 
Thomas, is this: "The ultimate source of the Constitution's author-
ity is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the 
consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole."57 
Despite the adoption of the Constitution, "the people of each State 
retained their separate political identities. "58 Even in language 
where others have found an affirmation of national unity, Justice 
Thomas found a reaffirmation of the fundamental status of the 
states as compared with the Nation: 
The ringing initial words of the Constitution - "We the People of 
the United States" - convey something of the same idea. (In the 
Constitution, after all, "the United States" is consistently a plural 
noun.") The Preamble that the Philadelphia Convention approved 
before sending the Constitution to the Committee of Style is even 
clearer. It began: "We the people of the States of New-Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecti-
cut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia .... " Scholars 
have suggested that the Committee of Style adopted the current lan-
guage because it was not clear that all the States would actually ratify 
the Constitution.s9 
In short, Justice Thomas said, the concept of popular sovereignty 
underlying the Constitution "tracks" rather than erases state lines.6o 
He found it senseless to interpret the Tenth Amendment as reserv-
ing powers to the "undifferentiated people of the Nation as a 
whole, because the Constitution does not contemplate that those 
54. Term Limits, 115 S. a. at 1855 (citations omitted). 
55. 115 s. a. at 1864. 
56. 115 S. Ct. at 1875. 
57. 115 S. Ct. at 1875. 
58. 115 s. a. at 1877. 
59. 115 S. Ct. at 1876 n.1 (citations omitted). Following Justice Thomas's interpretation, a 
more accurate wording might have been, "We the Peoples of the United States." 
60. See 115 S. a. at 1877. 
December 1995] Constitution's Cover Letter 625 
people will either exercise power or delegate it. The Constitution 
simply does not recognize any mechanism for action by the undif-
ferentiated people of the Nation."61 
Justice Kennedy, who had provided the crucial fifth vote in 
Lopez, refused to go along with Justice Thomas's view of state sov-
ereignty in Term Limits. In his view, the heart of the legitimacy of 
the federal government is "that it owes its existence to the act of the 
whole people who created it."62 Although the Framers, in his view, 
were "solicitous of the prerogatives of the States," the states could 
not be allowed to interfere with the exercise of federal powers or 
with "the most basic relation between the National Government 
and its citizens, the selection of legislative representatives."63 
To summarize, the New Federalism has three major premises. 
The first tenet is that the states retain crucial aspects of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is a concept we usually identify with independent na-
tions.64 To attribute sovereignty to the states is in some degree to 
assign them some aspect, if only residual, of nationhood. In the 
strongest version, that espoused by Raoul Berger and the four Term 
Limits dissenters, the sovereignty of the states is actually primary. 
The states came before the federal government, and they remain 
more fundamental to the constitutional scheme than the federal 
government, which is a creature of the separate peoples of the indi-
vidual states. A weaker version of this premise is that state sover-
eignty coexists with federal sovereignty. 
The second tenet derives from the recognition that, under the 
Supremacy Clause, federal power prevails where federal and state 
power overlap. Hence, if the states are to have some form of sover-
eignty, they must have some sphere of exclusive power or, at the 
very least, a sphere that the federal government can only enter 
under special circumstances. In the older version of the New Fed-
eralism - from League of Cities through Gregory - that separate 
61. 115 s. Ct. at urn. 
62. 115 S. Ct. at 1872; see also 115 S. Ct. at 1873. 
63. 115 S. Ct. at 1873. As this disagreement between Justice Kennedy and the other 
members of the conservative wing of the Court indicates, the New Federalism is not a mono-
lith. Interestingly enough, Justice Kennedy's arguments are very similar in structure to John 
Marshall's arguments about the Commerce Clause. Felix Frankfurter wrote that "Marshall's 
use of the commerce clause greatly furthered the idea that though we are a federation of 
states we are also a nation, and gave momentum to the doctrine that state authority must be 
subject to such limitations the Court finds it necessary to apply for the protection of the 
national community." FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CoMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARsHALL, 
TANEY AND WHITE 18-19 (1937). 
64. See Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 349-50 (explaining that the least problematic ex-
ample of sovereignty is an independent nation; the use of the concept of sovereignty in feder-
alism discussions derives from this paradigm case). 
626 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:615 
sphere was the internal operation of the state government. The 
various majority Justices in Lopez made different efforts to redefine 
the state sphere. Chief Justice Rehnquist essentially defined it by 
exclusion and claimed that the state sphere consisted of all areas 
that are not assigned to the federal government. In tum, he defined 
federal competence to cover three broad categories: regulation of 
the channels of interstate commerce; protection of interstate instru-
mentalities even from intrastate interference; and control of eco-
nomic activities "having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce."65 Justices Kennedy and O'Connor defined the sphere 
of presumptive state autonomy as consisting of noncommercial ac-
tivities traditionally regulated by the states. 66 Taking the broadest 
view of state sovereignty, Justice Thomas set aside regulation of 
manufacturing and agriculture for the states along with jurisdiction 
over all activities other than the interstate sale and shipment of 
goods. 
Finally, the New Federalism holds that the states are not merely 
a structural feature of our governmental system but an important 
affirmative good in need of protection. For the New Federalists, 
the states are not simply a fact of life in our democracy. Rather, in 
the suggestive words of Robert Nagel, federalism is a fundamental 
value.67 In particular, in order to safeguard individual liberty, the 
Court must maintain the balance of power between the states and 
the federal government,6s 
TII. THE WASHINGTON LETTER AND THE DEBATE OVER 
CONSTITUTIONAL METHODOLOGY 
The New Federalists claim their ideas represent the first princi-
ples of federalism, and so it is natural to investigate the understand-
ing of the Framers on this point. This historical inquiry is, as we will 
see, a matter of some difficulty. 
A. The Washington Letter 
Before we begin to ponder its legal significance, a close look at 
the letter itself is in order. With a few minor exceptions, the Consti-
tution we have today is the draft produced by the Committee on 
Style. Along with the penultimate draft of the Constitution, the 
65. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995). 
66. See 115 S. a. at 1640-42. 
67. See Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities 
in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 81. 
68. See id. at 88; see also text accompanying notes 36-42. 
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Committee was also charged with producing a cover letter. The 
Committee was small but distinguished: it consisted of Madison, 
Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, Rufus King, and the Chair, William 
Samuel Johnson. Thus, if nothing else, the cover letter represented 
an effort by some of the Convention's most distinguished members 
to explain the nature of the final product. Indeed, because the let-
ter was approved unanimously, paragraph by paragraph, and so far 
as we are aware, without debate, we must assume it reflects the 
views of the delegates generally about the nature of their work, at a 
time very close to the end of the process.69 It was, in short, a con-
sensus document, signed by George Washington as President of the 
Convention "by unanimous Order of the Convention." 
Apart from some obligatory flourishes at the beginning and end 
of the letter, it consists of four significant paragraphs. The first of 
these substantive paragraphs70 begins with a remark on the need to 
empower the federal government: "The friends of our country have 
long seen and desired, that the power of making war, peace, and 
treaties, that of levying money and regulating commerce, and the 
correspondent executive and judicial authorities should be fully and 
effectually vested in the general government of the Union."71 Be-
cause of the "impropriety" of entrusting "such extensive trust to 
one body of men," the letter continues, necessity demanded a "dif-
ferent organization" - presumably meaning the separation of 
powers. 
The next paragraph addresses the status of the states. "It is ob-
viously impracticable in the federal government of these states, to 
secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet pro-
vide for the interest and safety of all: Individuals entering into soci-
ety, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest."72 The 
"magnitude of the sacrifice," we are told, depends on the circum-
stances; the line between surrendered and reserved rights is always 
difficult to draw with precision, and the difficulty was increased 
here by the diverse situations of the various states. 
The next two paragraphs stress the imperative of a strong gov-
ernment and the need for compromise in attaining that end. "In all 
our deliberations," the delegates informed their fellow citizens, "we 
69. See JAMES MADISON, NoTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 17frl, at 
626 n.30 (1966). 
70. This is actually the second paragraph in the letter; the first is in the nature of a courtly 
salutation. 
71. See app. at 649. 
72. See id. 
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kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest in-
terest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in 
which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our na-
tional existence."73 As a result, the states were willing to give way 
at the Convention on points of "inferior magnitude," in a spirit of 
magnanimity and compromise. Although they recognized that no 
one was likely to like all aspects of the final product, the delegates 
hoped to have minimized objections to the extent possible, and it 
was their "most ardent wish" that the Constitution would "promote 
the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her 
freedom and happiness."74 
With that, in less than two printed pages, the Washington letter 
is over, except for a flowery signature line dubbing the delegates 
the "most obedient and humble servants" of the addressee, "His 
Excellency the President of Congress." The letter was duly trans-
mitted to Congress and then by Congress to the state legislatures, 
along with the text of the Constitution. 
B. The Interpretation Wars 
After its transmission to the states, the Washington letter seem-
ingly vanished from the annals of history. The reasons for resur-
recting it stem from recent debates over legal interpretation. 
One battleground has involved statutory interpretation. In re-
cent decades, statutory interpretation usually has involved an eclec-
tic mix of reliance on text, statutory purpose, public policy, and 
legislative history.75 In the 1980s, formalists mounted a challenge to 
this conventional approach in favor of a much more restrictive 
method of interpretation.76 As Bill Eskridge explains, "[f]ormalism 
posits that judicial interpreters can and should be tightly con-
strained by the objectively determinable meaning of a statute; if 
unelected judges exercise much discretion in these cases, demo-
cratic governance is threatened."77 Judge Easterbrook states: 
"Laws are designed to bind, to perpetuate a solution devised by the 
enacting legislature, and do not change unless the legislature affirm-
73. See id. 
74. See app. at 650. 
75. For a fuller discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory 
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990). 
76. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 61 (1994). 
77. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 646 (1990). 
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atively enacts something new .... Law does not change in meaning 
as the political culture changes."78 
According to formalists, legislative history should be consulted 
only under very limited circumstances. It is normally irrelevant be-
cause "the law" consists of the statute Congress passed, not the 
ideas in the minds of the legislators.79 Furthermore, authorizing the 
use of legislative history simply empowers judges to enact their own 
policy choices at the expense of the statutory languageso and allows 
individual legislators to make law without obtaining the full support 
of their colleagues.81 Additionally, formalists maintain, the ideas of 
legislative purpose and legislative intent are incoherent. A legisla-
ture is a collective body, whose members are often in disagreement 
and have no cogent set of preferences. Legislation is often a com-
promise between opposing interests whose only purpose is to strike 
a deal. "Legislation is compromise. Compromises have no spirit; 
they just are."82 Hence, when the legislature has failed to speak 
clearly on an issue, it is useless for a court to try to fill the gap by 
consulting the "spirit" of the statute. 
The conservative critique of legislative intent raises obvious 
questions about the appropriate role of original intent in constitu-
tional cases as well. Space does not permit a full discussion of the 
ongoing debate about originalism, but a review of some of its high-
lights will be useful in assessing the significance of the Washington 
letter. 
Evidence of original intent has always played a role in constitu-
tional adjudication. In the 1980s, conservative scholars argued that 
original intent should be the key factor in interpretation. This view 
was widely publicized as a result of speeches by then-Attorney 
General Edwin Meeses3 and then received even greater attention as 
a result of the Bork confirmation hearings.84 Today, as his opinions 
78. Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 69. 
79. See id. at 65-66. 
80. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371, 
376. 
81. See W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpreta-
tion Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 397-98 (1992). 
82. Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 68. 
83. For discussion of the early phases of this debate, see Murray Dry, Federalism and the 
Constitution: The Founders' Design and Contemporary Constitutional Law, 4 CoNST. CoM-
MENT. 233, 233-34 (1987). 
84. See BoRK, supra note 24, at 300-01. For a summary of the arguments for originalism, 
see Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 
46-56 (1987). 
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in Term Limits and Lopez illustrate, Justice Thomas seems to be the 
most aggressive practitioner of originalism on the Court. ss 
There are two basic normative arguments for originalism: first, 
that it is the only way to reconcile judicial review with majority rule 
and, second, that intent is the basis for interpreting all legal docu-
ments, of which the Constitution is only one. The first argument 
was nicely put by former Attorney General Meese: 
The Constitution represents the consent of the governed to the struc-
tures and powers of the government. The Constitution is the funda-
mental will of the people; that is the reason the Constitution is the 
fundamental law. To allow the courts to govern simply by what it 
views at the time as fair and decent, is a scheme of government no 
longer popular; the idea of democracy has suffered.s6 
As John Hart Ely has explained, originalism also coheres with 
an idea about legal interpretation that has wide currency in our 
legal culture: it "fits our usual conceptions of what law is and the 
way it works."87 In construing a statute, Ely says, "a court obvi-
ously will limit itself to a determination of the purposes and 
prohibitions expressed by or implicit in its language."BB We "might 
even consider a call to the lunacy commission" if a judge goes be-
yond the language of the statute "to enforce, in the name of the 
statute in question, those fundamental values he believe[ s] America 
ha[s] always stood for."B9 As Michael McConnell has argued, just 
as we look to original intent when interpreting contracts and wills, 
so we should do so when interpreting the Constitution.9° In short, 
85. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875-914 {1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642-51 {1995) {Thomas, J., 
concurring); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,115 S. Ct. 2510, 2528-
44 {1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1525-
30 {1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
86. See Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited 
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REv. 455, 465 (1986). Robert Bork eloquently reiterated this view 
in his confirmation hearing: "If a judge abandons intention as his guide, there is no law 
available to him and he begins to legislate a social agenda for the American people." BoRK, 
supra note 24, at 300. In response to this argument, critics of originalism have questioned 
whether majoritarianism should be considered our exclusive fundamental norm; whether the 
adoption of the Constitution itself met the requirements of that norm as we currently under-
stand it; and whether in fact the judicial branch should be considered less democratic than 
the legislature as a source of evolving social norms. For a survey of these arguments, see 
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF Tim AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
386-88 (1990). 
87. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST! A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 
(1980). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. See Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral 
Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J.1501,1525 {1989) {book review) (arguing that originalism 
is essentially the method used to interpret statutes, contracts, wills, and treaties). 
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this argument goes, originalism is simply the normal mode of inter-
preting all legal documents. 
At this point, conservative theorists may appear to be on a colli-
sion course with themselves. We saw earlier that conservative theo-
rists have launched a vigorous attack on the use of legislative 
history in statutory interpretation. How is this compatible with 
their attachment to originalism in constitutional law? The problem 
is particularly acute because of their "one size fits all" argument 
that originalism is the only legitimate method of legal interpretation 
for statutes, constitutions, and private legal instruments. 
Resolving this problem requires a closer look at how conserva-
tive theorists define the proper role of intent in both the statutory 
and constitutional contexts. In the constitutional context, Charles 
Fried cautions that judges should not consider "intent" a fact about 
the mental state of each drafter, as if the text itself were a kind of 
second-best, and we really would "prefer to take the top off the 
heads of authors and framers - like soft-boiled eggs - to look 
inside for the truest account of their brain states at the moment that 
the texts were created."91 Indeed, as Judge Easterbrook has 
pointed out, such an exercise would be doomed to failure because 
of the multiple authorship of public documents: "Peer inside the 
heads of legislators and you find a hodgepodge."92 
Rather than the soft-boiled-egg approach eschewed by Fried 
and Easterbrook, the more defensible originalist approach to mean-
ing is to formulate it as being objective. As Judge Easterbrook puts 
it, to determine the meaning of the words used in the text, we must 
consult its context: "The goals, purposes, concerns, of the authors 
illuminate things. Intent then informs a reading of the text, tells us 
its meaning."93 More specifically, that meaning is objective, based 
on the understanding of the text by a reasonable reader of the time 
who was familiar with the context.94 
On this view, then, originalism is not intended to discover the 
personal views of the drafters of the Constitution or the preferences 
and expectations of the ratifiers. Instead, it is intended to reveal 
91. Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 HARv. 
L. REV. 751, 758-59 (1987). 
92. Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 68 (concluding that for this reason "intent is empty"). 
93. Id. at 64. 
94. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 
417, 417-19 (1898); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. 
REv. 1231, 1231 n.1 (1994); McConnell, supra note 90, at 1526-29; Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. LJ. 217, 227 
n.23 (1994). 
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the objective understanding of the text by a reasonable person of 
the time. That reasonable person, in addition to other contextual 
knowledge, is also assumed to be aware of the "goals, purposes, and 
concerns of the authors" to the extent that such information was 
publicly available.95 Interpretation of statutes is directed at ascer-
taining the same kind of objective meaning, thus eliminating the 
disparity between constitutional originalism and statutory 
formalism. 96 
The remainder of this essay attempts to apply this methodology 
to the New Federalism, using the Washington letter as a fulcrum. 
There are two reasons for this choice of methodology. First, it is the 
most coherent and defensible statement of the favored conservative 
approach to interpretation. It seems appropriate to apply this inter-
pretative approach to the predominant conservative theory of fed-
eralism. Second, even for nonoriginalists, the original 
understanding has some bite. The nonoriginalist also may want to 
consult other historical materials for whatever light they shed on 
our traditions and aspirations as a society, but those tied most di-
rectly to the historic meaning of the text have a special claim to our 
attention. 
C. The Washington Letter and Conservative Theories of 
Interpretation 
This formulation of originalism has the drawback of intensifying 
some of the practical problems of implementing an originalist pro-
gram of interpretation. As no lesser light than Justice Scalia has 
told us: 
[I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding 
of an ancient text. Properly done, the task requires the consideration 
of an enormous mass of material - in the case of the Constitution 
and its Amendments, for example, to mention only one element, the 
records of the ratifying debates in all the states. Even beyond that, it 
requires an evaluation of the reliability of that material . . . . And 
further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellec-
tual atmosphere of the time . . . . It is, in short, a task sometimes 
better suited to the historian than the lawyer.97 
95. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 64. 
96. The problem of defining the "reasonable reader" and setting the parameters for her 
knowledge of context is not at all a trivial one, but this formulation does at least provide a 
coherent basis for some more elaborate theory of originalist interpretation. 
97. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evi~ 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 856-57 (1989). 
Some of the difficulties encountered by even extremely capable legal scholars are explored in 
Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 523 (1995). 
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Given this mass of material, one faces an unavoidable temptation to 
"look over a crowd and pick out your friends."98 As Judge 
Easterbrook has said about the quest to locate clues about meaning 
in legislative history: 
A Sherlock Holmes could work through the clues, and those most 
reliable, and draw unerring inferences. Alas, none of us is a worthy 
successor to Holmes . . . . We hear in the debates what we prefer to 
hear - and our preferences differ widely. Even when all of us hear 
the same thing, a search for these clues consumes resources but does -
not yield rewards comparable to the effort invested.99 
Hence, Judge Easterbrook says, judges must eschew an excessively 
nuanced approach in order to avoid unacceptable process and error 
costs.1oo 
The unreliability of some of the basic source materials further 
complicates the originalist task. There have been recurring charges 
that Madison later altered his notes, perhaps to reflect his own 
changing constitutional views. After a careful investigation, based 
on such matters as the watermarks on Madison's paper, historian 
James Hutson has concluded that any alterations were not signi:fi-
cant.l01 But Hutson points out that Madison gave only a highly ab-
breviated account of the debates, probably reporting less than one-
tenth of what was said.102 
Hutson points out even more severe problems with other parts 
of the documentary record. He concludes that the records of the 
ratification debates are too corrupt to be relied upon. For example, 
the Pennsylvania and Maryland debates were recorded by ardent 
Federalist Thomas Lloyd, who was paid by the Federalists to delete 
all of the Antifederalists' speeches. He reported only selected Fed-
98. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 {1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Similarly, Felix Frankfurter warned about the dangers of trying to glean "trends 
in American constitutional history" from judicial opinions coupled with other historical evi-
dence. Also, the risk of ripping a textual comment from its historical context and reading in a 
more lasting significance is great. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 63, at 9 ("We must be on 
our guard against over-sophistication, and not find luminous, deeply conceived, rational 
processes where there is only tentative, groping, obscure empiricism, or the instinctive and 
only half conscious response of habituation to a concrete controversy."). 
99. Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 61 {footnotes omitted). 
100. See id. at 70. 
101. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Docu-
mentary Record, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 24-33 (1986). 
102. Madison averaged about 2700 words per session in June, which is only about seven 
percent of the probable number of words spoken in each five-hour session. See id. at 34. The 
notes also seem to give particular attention to Madison's own remarks, a tendency that is 
understandable but which biases our knowledge of the debates. It also would not be surpris-
ing if he sometimes failed to resist the temptation to improve upon the oral version of his 
remarks when compiling the final written version. See id. at 35. 
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eralist speeches and even those seem to have been significantly 
revised.103 
We do possess voluminous printed matter from the ratification 
period, including most notably the Federalist Papers.104 These doc-
uments do not necessarily reflect the reasonable understanding of 
the text at the time it was written. The problems resemble those 
that formalists have described as affecting legislative debates: "The 
goal of each legislator is to create an expression, or at least an im-
pression, of the legislative intent on any points of interest to him or 
her."tos Thus, as in evaluating other narratives, the "stories" told 
by the Framers about the meaning of the Constitution must be eval-
uated for their typicality and accuracy, for these characteristics re-
flect the meaning that a reasonable reader would have placed on 
the document.106 A formalist, originalist approach to statutory in-
terpretation requires no less. Yet this task is one that, as Judge 
Easterbrook and Justice Scalia point out, judges can expect to per-
form only with difficulty and considerable risk of error. 
In many respects, the Washington letter is unique in its relative 
immunity from these difficulties. First, and most obviously, it is free 
from the problems of reliability that plague the records of the de-
bates of the Philadelphia and ratification conventions. It is an offi-
cial written document - indeed, the only explanation ever issued 
in any official form prior to ratification regarding the meaning of 
the Constitution. What it says may or may not be significant, but, at 
least, we need entertain no doubt about its actual content. This in 
itself makes the Washington letter far more useful than the ratifica-
tion debates and, to a lesser degree, than Madison's notes. 
Second, the letter is less prone to disputes about typicality than 
other ratification-related documents. Hamilton and Madison, the 
primary authors of the Federalist Papers, were members of the 
small committee that drafted the letter, so we can be confident that 
it reflects their views. But it also reflects the views of the other 
members of that committee, George Washington, who signed it, 
and the remaining delegates, considering that it was unanimously 
approved without debate after a paragraph-by-paragraph review. 
As an official document, the Washington letter has the advantage of 
a formal process of enactment. Neither individual remarks at the 
103. See id. at 22-23. 
104. See id. at 12-24. 
105. Slawson, supra note 81, at 396. 
106. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on 
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993). 
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Convention nor the various documents produced during the ratifi-
cation period were subject to this process of deliberation and ap-
proval before they were issued. 
Third, the Washington letter is less prone than other sources to 
problems of conscious or unconscious distortion by its authors. To 
begin with, it was designed for a nationwide audience, so the au-
thors would have been unable to tailor it to the exigencies of the 
ratification process in particular states. Because the ratification 
process had not yet begun, they were faced with a "veil of igno-
rance" about the politics of ratification and would have found it 
somewhat more difficult to doctor their expressed interpretation of 
the Constitution in a play for political support. 
Finally, the Washington letter has the virtues of its defects, those 
defects being its brevity and its historical obscurity. The letter was 
carefully considered at the Convention and then disseminated to 
the states in connection with ratification, but it never excited any 
discussion. The simplest explanation for the lack of discussion is 
that it simply repeated what everyone then - but not necessarily 
today - already understood. The letter's brevity is also a major 
virtue, given the time limitations on judges and also the risk that 
more voluminous documents will be consciously or unconsciously 
"mined" for material favoring a judge's position. 
Thus, if we are to follow the strictures of Judge Easterbrook and 
Justice Scalia in our use of historical materials, the Washington let-
ter has a virtually unique claim to our attention. It is not only de-
serving of attention in its own right but very useful in minimizing 
what Judge Easterbrook calls the process and error costs of utilizing 
other historical materials107 because it provides a handy gauge of 
their reliability and typicality. We tum, then, to a consideration of 
the implications of the Washington letter for the debate over the 
New Federalism. 
JV. THE WASIDNGTON LETTER AND THE TENETS OF THE 
NEW FEDERALISM 
As we saw in Part IT, the New Federalism centers on three pro-
positions: (1) the states retain a - possibly primary - sovereignty; 
(2) this sovereignty is reflected in the existence of presumptive lim-
its on federal jurisdiction; and (3) the Framers viewed this separa-
tion of state and federal power as a guarantee of liberty. These 
tenets form the basis for the argument that the courts should inter-
107. See supra text accompanying note 100. 
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vene to preserve the "balance of federalism" the Framers designed. 
We will consider these three tenets in order. 
A. The Question of Sovereignty 
The original understanding of sovereignty is the kind of histori-
cal question that is most difficult for judges to analyze. The concept 
of sovereignty had great significance for the framing generation and 
has generated a corresponding amount of interest among histori-
ans.108 Unraveling the meaning of these historical records has 
proven quite difficult. The Framers' debate was driven by their im-
mediate political interests, which gave them an incentive to distort 
whatever their true philosophical positions might have been.109 
Various senses of the word "sovereignty" were not carefully distin-
guished.110 As one historian puts it, the Framers were "politically 
multilingual," using a variety of political theories whenever those 
theories suited their purposes.nt 
We usefully can delineate three views of the sovereignty issues: 
Pure Nationalism (Lincoln's theory): The colonies declared indepen-
dence as a collective body, which thereby succeeded to the sover-
eignty formerly held by the King. This national sovereignty always 
remained with the federal government throughout a series of govern-
mental reorganizations - first the Articles of Confederation, then 
the Constitution.112 
Transformational Nationalism: The states retained their separate sov-
ereignty until the adoption of the Constitution, which created a new 
national sovereign - "E pluribus unum. "113 
108. For recent discussions by historians, see SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: 
THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 197- 202, 236, 248-55, 314-15, 320-28 (1993); 
RICHARD B. MoRRis, THE FoRGING OF THE UNION 1781-1789, at 55-63 (1987); GoRDoN S. 
Wooo, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 344-89, 524-36 (1969). 
109. For example, one issue was whether the colonies had declared independence collec-
tively, so that sovereignty at least momentarily reposed in the Continental Congress, or sev-
erally, so that it resided in the states at the time of Independence. This seemingly esoteric 
question had legal implications regarding title to vast disputed areas of land. Under the 
former theory, western land claimed by Virginia had instead reverted to the Continental 
Congress at the time of Independence. See FoRREST McDoNALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: 
THE INTELLEcruAL ORIGINS oF THE CoNSTITUTION 146 (1985). 
110. For a modem effort to do so, see Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 346-58. For a dis-
cussion of the confusion during the framing period, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Political 
Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 985-87 (1993). 
111. See McDoNALD, supra note 109, at 235. 
112. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WouLD Go OF ITSELF: THE CoNsTITU-
TION IN AMERICAN CuLTURE 109 (1986) (reprinting a Civil War-era constitutional cate-
chism); JAMES M. McPHERSON, BATILE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 246-48 
(1988); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF REcoNSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 25-27 (1966). 
113. This theory was endorsed, for example, by the majority in the Term Limits case. See 
United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1855 (1995); see also Akhil Reed 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.1425, 1460 (1987) (arguing that although 
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State Populism (Calhoun's theory): During Independence, the people 
of each state separately became sovereign. When they adopted the 
Constitution, they retained their separate political existences, but del-
egated some of their powers to the national government and some to 
the state govemments.l14 
As the dispute in the Term Limits case illustrates, there is no con-
sensus about which of these theories provides the best legal fit with 
the historic facts or which one was the dominant understanding of 
the framing period.us 
With respect to this issue, strictures about the dangers of gener-
alist judges attempting to untangle a complex and ambiguous his-
torical record seem especially forceful. The likelihood that busy 
judges will master the vast amount of historical material is not 
great. Given this large, complex historical record, a substantial risk 
exists that judges - or more realistically, their law clerks116 - sim-
ply will look for friendly faces in the crowd, picking out the histori-
cal data that most clearly support their position. Hence, it is wise to 
follow Judge Easterbrook's advice and reduce process and error 
costs.117 The Washington letter can provide great assistance in this 
respect because of its strong claim to reliability and typicality.118 
The Washington letter sheds interesting, though not entirely un-
ambiguous, light on this sovereignty issue. The third paragraph of 
the letter plainly contemplates some loss of sovereignty by the 
states and its transfer to the federal government: "It is obviously 
impracticable in the federal government of these states, to secure 
Article VII said the Constitution would go into effect when nine states ratified it, it "con-
firmed the pre-existing sovereignty of the People of each state by proclaiming that the Consti-
tution would go into effect only between the ... states [that ratified it]." Id. at 1460. "Once 
the individual states ratified the Constitution, however, they transferred their sovereignty to 
the people of the nation." Id.). 
114. See Amar, supra note 113, at 1452 & nn.108-09; see also McPHERSON, supra note 
112, at 240; STAMPP, supra note 112, at 25. During the period before the Civil War, southern 
states justified secession with the theory that the state populace, in adopting the Constitution, 
had appointed the federal government to act as their agent with regard to certain functions 
but that such an agency relationship did not transfer sovereignty to the federal government. 
See DA vro M. PoTIER, THE IMPENDING Crus1s, 1848-1861, at 479 (1976). The people of each 
state, the theory went, retained the power to nullify the agency relationship by action of a 
state convention. See id. 
115. Compare Justice Thomas's views in his Term Limits dissent, 115 S. Ct. at 1875-77, 
with those of Justice Kennedy in his concurrence, 115 S. Ct. at 1872. As to the views of 
leading modem commentators, see BEER, supra note 108, at 200-02, 236, 320-21 (endorsing 
the pure nationalism theory); Amar, supra note 113; H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Ques-
tion of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633, 654-60 (1993). The second theory may have 
an edge among modem commentators. 
116. See Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of Judicial Power, 59 Mo. L. REv. 281, 
300, 306 (1994). 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100. 
118. See supra text accompanying note 107. 
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all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for 
the interest and safety of all: Individuals entering into society, must 
give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest."119 Clearly, the states 
were seen as losing some "rights of independent sovereignty."12o 
Moreover, the drafters did not portray the Constitution as merely 
an agreement between states that retained their separate existence. 
The letter compares the Constitution with the social compact, 
which is an irrevocable creation of a unified society - short of cir-
cumstances justifying revolution. The implications of this analogy 
to the social compact later would be discussed in the Federalist 
Papers: 
If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must 
be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political 
societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the latter 
may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its constitution, 
must necessarily be supreme over those societies and the individuals, 
of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, 
dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government 
121 
Hammering the point home, the fourth paragraph of the Wash-
ington letter speaks of the "consolidation of our Union."122 The 
second paragraph speaks similarly of perfecting "the general gov-
ernment of the Union," which seems to contemplate a degree of 
political unity, rather than a mere league between entities that re-
tain their own sovereign identities.123 
There is also support for the first theory, that of pure national-
ism. The second paragraph speaks of the "friends of our country," 
as if "our country" were an existing entity rather than merely a con-
catenation of separate units.124 The fourth paragraph says that the 
"consolidation of our Union" is "the greatest interest of every true 
American," which again implies that a union already exists and that 
119. See app. at 649. 
120. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457, 507 (1994) ("[A] state people can be bound by a 
federal amendment even if that state people in [a] state convention explicitly reject[] the 
amendment."); see also ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS! THEIR 
NATURE, PoWERS, AND LiMITATIONS 168-69 (1917) (arguing that the union of states in 1787 
bound future state conventions to the Federal Constitution and eliminated their power to 
elect to do anything in contravention of the Constitution). 
121. THE FEDERAUST No. 33 at 257 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1865). 
122. See also James Wtlson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted 
in THE FoUNDERS' CoNSTITUTION at 62 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ("I 
consider the people of the United States as forming one great community, and I consider the 
people of the different States as forming communities again on a lesser scale."). 
123. See app. at 649. 
124. See id. 
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Americans are in some sense already one people.125 Similarly, the 
fifth paragraph expresses the hope that the Constitution will "pro-
mote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all," rather 
than saying "those countries so dear to each of us. "126 More to the 
point, the fourth paragraph warns that the consolidation of the 
Union involves "our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our na-
tional existence."127 The clear implication is that, in some sense, 
there is already a national existence capable of being at risk, which 
is to say that the United States under the Articles of Confederation 
was already a nation of sorts rather than a league.128 
On balance, the Washington letter seems clearly to endorse at 
least the transformational nationalism, if not the pure nationalism, 
theory of sovereignty. Thus, it provides important support for the 
views Justice Kennedy expressed when he broke ranks with the 
other New Federalists in the Term Limits case. He argued that the 
national government "owes its existence to the act of the whole 
people who created it" and stated that "the people of the United 
States . . . have a political identity as well, one independent of, 
though consistent with, their identity as citizens of the State of their 
residence."129 Moreover, the Washington letter is inconsistent with 
Justice Thomas's view that the people of the individual states retain 
their separate sovereignty as "the only true source of power."130 
B. Separate Spheres? 
The New Federalists stress aspects of the historical record that 
emphasize the limited powers of the federal government and the 
powers over local matters retained by the state governments. It is 
difficult to assess the import of some of these sources, although the 
federal government undoubtedly was not expected to be omnipo-
tent. As Michael McConnell points out, this particular New Feder-
125. See id. 
126. See app. at 650. 
127. See app. at 649. 
128. See Letter from George Washington to Charles Carter (Dec. 27, 1787), in 1 THE 
DEBATE ON THE CoNSTITUTION 612 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (arguing for ratification of 
the Constitution: "I am fully persuaded [the Constitution] is the best that can be obtained at 
this 1ime ... and that it or Disunion is before us to choose from."); see also Abraham Lincoln 
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE CAusES OF THE CiviL WAR 
38-39 (1959). Abraham Lincoln stated that the Constitution is not a contract among states 
and that "(t]he Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the 
Articles of Association in 1774." Id. at 39. 
129. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct 1842, 1872 (1995) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
130. 115 S. Ct at 1876. 
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alist argument may "confuse the founders' expectations about how 
the nation would be governed under the Constitution with the foun-
ders' understanding of the meaning of the Constitution."131 
In any event, those taking a more expansive view of federal 
power also have identified support in the historical record for their 
position. One historian recently referred to the Convention as a 
"rally of nationalists."132 Another eminent historian observed that 
the Antifederalists "had no doubt that it was precisely an absorp-
tion of all the states under one unified government that the Consti-
tution intended, and they therefore offered this prospect of an 
inevitable consolidation as the strongest and most scientifically 
based objection to the new system that they could muster."133 It is 
clear that the whole purpose of the Constitution was to strengthen 
the weak government the Articles of Confederation created; the 
question is how far down the road to centralized government the 
Framers intended to go.t34 
The Washington letter's discussion of governmental powers has 
a strongly nationalistic bent. It emphasizes the imperative of "con-
solidation of our Union" to further the interests of prosperity and 
security. It thereby embraced the very term - "consolidation" -
that represented the worst fears of the Antifederalists. It also por-
trays the goal of "fully and effectually vesting" key powers in the 
national government, in particular those relating to foreign affairs, 
taxation, and commerce. These powers are portrayed as too impor-
tant to trust to any one body of men. Conspicuously, the letter 
131. McConnell, supra note 34, at 1490. For example, McConnell addresses whether the 
founders expected agriculture to become an important industry: 
I agree ... that they did not. Hamilton, no advocate of "states' rights," wrote that "the 
supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature ... which are proper 
to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdic-
tion." Does it follow that the Congress of 150 years later acted iUegitimately when it 
concluded that regulation of agriculture was a "necessary and proper" means for curing 
national economic depression? The framers and ratifiers of the Constitution established 
rules and standards for determining the scope of national authority; that those rules and 
standards produce different outcomes in later circumstances is neither surprising nor 
troubling .... [T]he founders' expectations about agriculture are interesting and impor-
tant, but cannot take precedence over the constitutional standard. 
/d. at 1490-91 (citations omitted). 
132. See MoRRis, supra note 108, at 269. Because of his wartime experiences as com-
mander of the Revolutionary Army, Washington took a particularly dim view of state prerog-
atives. See GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAUSM 
127 (1993). 
133. Wooo, supra note 108, at 526. 
134. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 1 THE 
FoUNDERS' CoNSTITUTION 150-53 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (summariz-
ing complaints about Congress's lack of powers under the Articles). 
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makes no mention of any specific areas being reserved out of fed-
eral jurisdiction. 
It may be wor$ emphasizing that the Washington letter cited 
regulation of commerce as one of the key purposes of the Constitu-
tion, on par with national security.135 Thus, the New Federalists are 
wrong to say that the commerce power "was given no place of par-
ticular prominence" and was "only one among nearly a score of 
other powers. "136 
Apart from the Commerce Clause, the federal government was 
given an impressive array of economic powers. These powers were 
far-reaching in their own right and rather conspicuously extend to 
areas of allegedly "local" concern such as agriculture and manufac-
turing. A perusal of Article !137 shows that the federal government 
had broad control over monetary policy and credit, via the bank-
ruptcy power (as contrasted with the Contract Clause limitation on 
the states), the exclusive power to coin money, and the power to 
issue debt. The spending and taxing power gave the federal govern-
ment the authority to encourage local industries through protective 
tariffs and to expend funds for vaguely defined purposes.138 The 
patent power also clearly intruded on the manufacturing sector, as 
did the power to establish a national system of standards. This ar-
ray of powers makes it dubious to define local production as a dis-
tinctively state preserve from which the federal government was 
debarred. 
It is understandable that the Antifederalists were alarmed by 
this transfer of powers to Congress. To see how important those 
powers were, suppose that a proposal were made to give the Organ-
ization of American States (OAS) the following powers: complete 
control of foreign affairs within and outside the hemisphere; the 
power to tax and spend money on the common welfare of the hemi-
sphere; exclusive power to issue currency; control of commerce 
135. See Alexander Hamilton's Conjectures About the New Constitution (Sept. 1787), in 
1 THE DEBATE ON THE CoNSTITUTION, supra note 128, at 9 (listing circumstances that would 
weigh in favor of adoption of the new Constitution including "the good will of the commer-
cial interest throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a 
government capable of regulating protecting and extending the commerce of the Union"). 
136. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 268 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). For the argu-
ment that commercial concerns were preeminent, see Jim Chen & Daniel Gifford, Law As 
Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1315, 1322-25 
(1995). 
137. See U.S. CaNST. art. I. 
138. Madison thought it was clear that the encouragement of manufacture was one of the 
purposes of the Commerce Clause. See DREw R. McCoY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: 
JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBUCAN LEGACY 127 (1989). 
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among the Americas and with other continents; jurisdiction over all 
cases involving the OAS charter and even over cases involving citi-
zens of more than one country - and then add the proviso that the 
OAS's rule will be the "supreme law of the hemisphere." 
In one sense, this is a limited set of powers. In another sense, 
these powers are broad enough that it would be quite understanda-
ble if today's equivalents of the Antifederalists thought that almost 
everything of importance had been lost. Quite likely, the full sweep 
of these powers would not be realized for decades, but no one 
would doubt that the potential for a tremendous reallocation of 
power was present. This is not to say that the OAS's powers would 
be unlimited or that the OAS courts would or would not be justified 
in attempting to draw some limits in construing those powers. But 
the charter would represent a shift in power away from more local-
ized governments and a shift of the most profound kind. 
As Madison said, and as the Lopez Court recounted, it is true 
that the powers of the federal government are "few and defined. "139 
But the Antifederalists were right to demur from the conclusion 
that, as a present-day commentator puts it, "[t]his is not the stuff of 
which Leviathan is made."14o "Four score and seven years" after 
independence, after all, these powers proved quite sufficient to the 
task of crushing a rebellion by half the country, including some of 
the key original states, and in the process extirpating an institution 
fundamental to the economy and culture of those states. That ac-
tion proved feasible, it bears noting, without whatever expansion of 
federal authority was to take place another seventy years later in 
the New Deal. 
The Washington letter also contains another important clue 
about the scope of congressional power. Notice that the judicial 
power is described as "correspondent" with the great powers given 
Congress.141 Reversing the equation, an examination of the judicial 
power can help illuminate the scope of congressional power. Dur-
ing the founding period, the general presumption was that a gov-
ernment's legislative and judicial power must be coterminous.142 
As Hamilton said in Federalist No. 80, "[i]f there are such things as 
political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a govern-
139. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995). 
140. Lawson, supra note 94, at 1234. 
141. See app. at 649. 
142. See G. EowARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL CouRT AND CuLTURAL CHANGE, 1815-
1835, at 124-127, 486 (1988); G. Edward White, Recovering Coterminous Power Theory, 14 
NovA L. REv. 155 (1989); see also Powell, supra note 115, at 660-61. 
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ment being coextensive with its legislature may be ranked among 
the number."143 
Hamilton was speaking in terms of federal question jurisdiction, 
but the remainder of Article IIJ144 contains an important reminder 
for those who would narrowly define the sphere of federal authority 
and erect a protected bastion of exclusive state jurisdiction. Juris-
diction based on citizenship is a critical segment of Article III, and 
the result of diversity jurisdiction is that any dispute involving even 
one nonresident could be handed to the federal courts by Con-
gress.145 At the time, it was far from clear that a federal court 
would have to follow state common law rulings - this was, after 
all, nearly a century and a half before the Erie doctrine was an-
nounced.146 Note that the state courts were to be displaced in a 
broad range of cases, not just commercial ones, and certainly not 
just cases involving the interstate trade in goods. In addition, the 
federal courts were given jurisdiction through the Admiralty Clause 
of the major mode of transportation, whether or not any particular 
litigation involved either citizens of different states or interstate 
commerce. Once again, the idea of protecting traditional areas of 
state concern from federal intrusion seems not to have been at the 
forefront. The focus was on the need to enhance federal power, not 
on the need to protect state jurisdiction, whether legislative or 
judicial. 
An understanding of the coterminous power axiom would have 
prevented a misstep by the New Federalists in New York v. United 
States. 147 In New York, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court 
insisted that Congress lacks the power to issue affirmative man-
dates to state governments.148 It is quite clear, however, that fed-
eral courts do have the power to issue affirmative mandates to the 
states.l49 The Washington letter's description of the judicial power 
143. THE FEDERAUST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). 
144. See U.S. CoNST. art. III. 
145. See U.S. CoNST. art. III. Consistently with the coterminous power thesis, Justice 
Marshall spoke of Congress as lacking legislative power in just those cases in which the fed-
eral courts would lack diversity jurisdiction, when he denied that Congress could make "laws 
affecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or claims, between citizens of the 
same state." See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1645-46 n.4 (1995) (quoting 
Marshall). 
146. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Note that judicial power re-
tained its broad scope until just the time when legislative power had expanded enough to 
take its place. 
147. 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
148. See 505 U.S. at 166. 
149. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Colorado 
v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185 (1982); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922). 
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as "correspondent" with congressional power suggests strongly that 
· the courts have no greater power to invade the prerogatives of the 
states - or conversely put, that Congress has as much power to do 
so as the federal courts.tso Given the unchallenged rule that the 
federal courts do indeed have such power, congressional power to 
issue affirmative mandates to the states necessarily follows, via the 
coterminous power axiom. 
C. Federalism as a Fundamental Value 
What of the role of the states as independent guardians of lib-
erty? Was this an important animating motive behind the drafting 
of the Constitution? Not if the Washington letter is any indication. 
It does speak at length about the need to respect the interests of 
various states so as to convince them to agree to a stronger Union. 
But the letter does not say a word about the importance of main-
taining the states as a check on the federal government. 1St The only 
reference to the need to restrain the possible abuse of federal 
power is in the second paragraph. There the letter states that the 
commerce, tax, and war powers are too dangerous to entrust to any 
one body, so a "different organization" was needed.1s2 The solu-
tion was to divide those powers among more than one body - the 
House, the Senate, and the President - so as to prevent abuse. 
Thus, the letter does refer obliquely to the separation of powers as 
a safeguard against the abuse of federal power, but nowhere does it 
refer, even obliquely, to federalism as such a safeguard. 
This omission should not be surprising, for the evidence cited by 
the New Federalists on this point stems exclusively from the ratifi-
cation period, rather than the Convention or an earlier period. Jus-
tice O'Connor's opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft, for example, relies 
solely on two paragraphs from the Federalist Papers for historical 
support.t53 Perhaps even more strikingly, Michael McConnell's his-
torical analysis relies quite heavily on the views of the Antifederal-
150. See app. at 649. 
151. Indeed, a justification for granting the federal government greater powers was that, 
due to self-interest, it was more likely that abuses of power would occur if the state govern-
ments held a power than if the federal government held it. See THE FEDERAUST No. 59, at 
452-53 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864) ("The people of America may be 
warmly attached to the government of the union, at times when the particular rulers of par-
ticular states .•• are capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the 
public weal."). 
152. See app. at 649. 
153. See 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991). 
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ists and stresses their desire to maintain state autonomy.1s4 Indeed, 
as Jefferson Powell has documented, the views of the leading New 
Federalists, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, 
have as much in common with those of the Antifederalists as with 
those generally expressed by the Constitution's supporters.1ss In 
essence, the New Federalists seem to view the Constitution almost 
as if it was a compromise between those who drafted it and their 
opponents. 
Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia156 offers an argument for the 
existence of this post-Convention compromise. According to Jus-
tice Powell, 
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was rooted in 
the fear that the National Government would be too powerful and 
eventually would eliminate the States as viable political entities. This 
concern was voiced repeatedly until proponents of the Constitution 
made assurances that a Bill of Rights, including a provision explicitly 
reserving powers in the States, would be among the first business of 
the new Congress.157 
Powell goes on to cite Samuel Adams and George Mason, both 
prominent opponents of the Constitution, on the dangers of na-
tional power. He then adds that "Antifederalists raised these con-
cerns in almost every state ratifying convention."158 Then, the story 
continues: 
So strong was the concern that the proposed Constitution was seri-
ously defective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision 
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the votes for 
ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded that such provisions 
were necessary. It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a 
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new Congress. 
Accordingly, the 10 Amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights 
were proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First 
Congress.159 
154. See McConnell, supra note 34, at 1493 (relying on the "Federal Farmer"); see id. at 
1500 (quoting Patrick Henry); see id. at 1507·08 (quoting from an Antifederalist essay, Bru-
tus); see id. at 1509 (relying again on the Federal Farmer). 
155. See Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 
YALE L.J. 1317 (1982); Powell, supra note 115 (discussing Justice O'Connor). Thus, from a 
historian's perspective, members of the school of thought discussed in this essay equally well 
might be called the New Antifederalists. 
156. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
157. 469 U.S. at 568. 
158. 469 U.S. at 569 (citation omitted). 
159. 469 U.S. at 569 (citations omitted). A similar theory is found in BERGER, supra note 
28, at 78-80. 
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This is certainly not an unconventional view of the origins of the 
Bill of Rights, but it suffers from two weaknesses. The first objec-
tion is formalist. To paraphrase Judge Easterbrook, what matters is 
not the intention of the Framers of the Tenth Amendment to pro-
tect the states but the language they enacted. That language is only 
a truism that adds nothing of substance to the Constitution.16o The 
second objection is historical. The adoption of the Bill of Rights 
actually was not compelled as a part of a deal integral to the inau-
guration of the new government .. In fact, after ratification, interest 
quickly waned in adopting a Bill of Rights, and Madison had great 
difficulty in even getting the matter on the House fioor.161 Notably, 
both former Federalists and Antifederalists opposed consideration 
of a Bill of Rights in the first Congress. Antifederalist interest in a 
Bill of Rights seems, in many cases, to have been primarily a ploy to 
derail ratification.t62 
On balance, whatever verbal assurances that the Federalists felt 
called upon to offer on occasion during the ratification debates, 
these assurances provide little ground to infer a change in the gen-
eral understanding of the meaning of the document between the 
time it was proposed and the time it was ratified. No doubt the 
Constitution was adopted against a background of deep attachment 
to the states, but the document gives little sign of constitutionalizing 
states' rights as a fundamental value. Nor did the Tenth Amend-
ment work any substantive change in federal power. As formalists 
like Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook have reminded us, it is 
important not to confuse the general views and desires of those who 
create laws \vith the content of what they have actually enacted.163 
V. CoNCLUSION 
This essay has been concerned with the core of "original intent": 
the general understanding of the meaning of the text at the time of 
enactment. I find it somewhat unrealistic to posit a single original 
understanding. For example, Madison took a notoriously short 
time to discover that his understanding of the text was rather differ-
160. The Tenth Amendment is probably best understood as a counter to the Antifederal-
ist argument that because the new government would be sovereign and because sovereignty 
is inherently unlimited, all of the powers of government were necessarily possessed by the 
federal government. 
161. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 86, at 226. Even after he introduced the Bill of 
Rights, Madison had difficulty persuading his colleagues to view the matter as important. See 
id. at 231-32. 
162. See id. at 227. 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82, 86 & 97-99. 
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ent from that of his fellow delegates Hamilton and Washington.164 
It might be more accurate, therefore, to speak of the range of origi-
nal understandings that the text was capable of supporting in its 
historical context. Most constitutional scholars would disagree with 
the assertion that original intent, defined in these terms, is the be-
ginning and end of constitutional interpretation, but few would re-
ject its relevance. 
Extracting some understanding of the original intent from a 
large and confusing historical record is a tricky job even for profes-
sional historians specializing in the period. This task is all the more 
difficult for judges and constitutional lawyers. One purpose of this 
essay is to suggest a more self-conscious selection of sources that is 
keyed to our normative theory of constitutional interpretation. If 
our normative theory requires us to determine the general under-
standing of the text, we are particularly in need of reliable evidence 
of widely shared understandings, as opposed to the viewpoints of a 
few individuals at a particular time. We also need to distinguish 
between meanings that are directly attributable to the text and 
ideas reflecting background assumptions and values that may or 
may not have been incorporated in the text and to do so carefully. 
Unfortunately, reliability is also a problem in terms of ascertaining 
the content of the key debates of the framing period. 
The essay puts forward, as a candidate for particular attention in 
reconstructing the original understanding, the cover letter from the 
Constitutional Convention, which was signed by George 
Washington on behalf of the Convention and accompanied the 
transmittal of the Constitution to the Continental Congress and to 
the states. 
Using the Washington letter for guidance, we can gauge the ex-
tent to which the text of the Constitution was intended to reinforce 
the national government as opposed to embracing the states. This 
question is obviously a matter of degree. The Framers clearly did 
not envision an omnipotent federal government, on the one hand, 
but they did mean to strengthen it greatly. The New Federalists 
have argued that the states were meant to retain sovereign regula-
tory authority and that the preservation of this authority was cen-
tral to the constitutional design for protecting liberty. The 
Washington letter does contemplate the continued independent 
existence of the states and suggests that their interests will be 
164. For a recent discussion of the Framers' traumatic discovery that they were deeply 
divided about how to implement the powers of the new government, see JAMES RoGER 
SHARP, AMERICAN Pouncs IN TIIE EARLY REPUBUC: THE NEw NATION IN CRisis (1993). 
648 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:615 
served best by adoption of the Constitution. But it treats the states 
more as a fact of life than as essential safeguards of liberty and 
rejects the idea that they will retain their independent sovereignty 
after ratification. Thus, to the extent that the philosophy embraced 
by the New Federalists such as Justices O'Connor and Thomas 
claims to flow from the original understanding of the Framers, it 
has a shaky foundation.t6s 
165. Of course, the results in particular cases such as Lopez may be valid, even if the 
theory invoked to support them has a weak foundation. For most of us, the correctness of 
these decisions cannot be decided solely on the basis of original intent. In considering the 
ultimate constitutional questions presented by these cases, it is well to remember the teach-
ing of Justice Holmes that the Framers "called into life a being the development of which 
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters." "It was enough 
for them," Holmes went on to say, "to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; 
it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they 
created a nation." So, he concluded, questions of national power must be considered in the 
light of our whole history, not merely on the basis of original intent. Missouri v. Holland, 252 
U.S. 416, 433 (1920); see also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity 
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395,443-72 (1995) (discussing constitutional evolution and the 
New Deal). For further reflections on the role of original intent in constitutional interpreta· 
tion, see FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 86, at 392-94. For an interesting discussion of 
Madison's views on the need to respect established readings of the Constitution, see McCoY, 
supra note 138, at 128. Whether Lopez and other New Federalist opinions pass muster under 
this standard is a question for another day. 
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APPENDIX 
Letter of the President of the Federal Convention, Dated Septem-
ber 17, 1787, to the President of Congress, Transmitting the 
Constitution. 
In Convention, September 17, 1787. 
Sir, 
We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the 
United States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which has 
appeared to us the most adviseable. 
The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the 
power of making war, peace, and treaties, that of levying money 
and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and ju-
dicial authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the gen-
eral government of the Union: But the impropriety of delegating 
such extensive trust to one body of men is evident - Hence results 
the necessity of a different organization. 
It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these 
states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and 
yet provide for the interest and safety of all: Individuals entering 
into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. 
The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and 
circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times diffi-
cult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must 
be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the pres-
ent occasion this difficulty was increased by a difference among the 
several states as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular 
interests. 
In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our 
view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true 
American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our 
prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This im-
portant consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our 
minds, led each state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of 
inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected; and 
thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit 
of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the 
peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensible. 
That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state is 
not perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless consider, that 
had her interest been alone consulted, the consequences might have 
been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is liable 
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to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we 
hope and believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that 
country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is 
our most ardent wish. 
With great respect, We have the honor to be, Sir, 
Your Excellency's 
most obedient and humble servants, 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, President 
By unanimous Order of the Convention. 
His Excellency the PRESIDENT OF CoNGRESS. 
